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ABSTRACT 
A cross sectional stu& initiated among the Public Health Enforcement Inspectors in state of Selangor, 
Malaysia in July 2003 using a self administered questionnaire and universal sampling with the purpose to 
determine the capacity of public health laws enforcement and factors influencing it. A total of 99 
respondents from the Health Districts Ofices and I00 respondents from the Local Municipal Health 
Departments participated in this study. It was found that the level of enforcement is generally low in all the 
units except for two units; the Food Unit and Sanitary and Hygiene Units. Factors found to influence 
enforcement capacity are the units' the enforcers work in and the length of service being in the same unit. 
Further analysis using multiple logistic regression, showed that respondents from the Food Unit (adjusted 
odds ratio 22; CI 95% : 7.851, 58.896), enforcers from the middle level category (adjusted odds ratio 5; Cl  
95% :1.397, 17.630), duration of service of 4 years and above in the same unit (adjusted odds ratio 6; CI 
95% :2.174, 13.747), past acceptance of formal service rewards from their departments (adjusted odds 
ratio 3; CI 95% : 1.150, 6.917); low exposure to bribery (adjusted odds ratio 46; CI 95% : 2.336, 1000) 
and have in the past being oflered bribes while on the field (adjusted odds ratio 3; CI 95% : 1.018, 4.772) 
are associated with higher enforcement capacity. In conclusion; die  attention must be looked into the 
enforcement organization with respect to the duration of service, acknowledgement via service rewards and 
monitoring of bribes exposure will help shape a better public health laws' enforcement capacity. 
Keywords: Health enforcement, enforcement, public health laws. 
INTRODUCTION LITERATURE REVIEW 
Protecting the public's health comes hand in 
hand with its public health laws and their 
enforcement. According to Gasner et al. (1999), 
Gebbie (2000), Fidler (2001), WHO (2002), 
Baker & Koplan (2002); for handling the 
diversity and further commitment of public 
health laws enforcement, the working capacity 
and effectiveness of public health officers are 
pertinent in meeting the above objectives. 
Mismanagement and mishandling of public 
health laws coupled with under capacity of 
public health laws enforcers, will cause a 
disarray among public health organizations, the 
public they're protecting and consequences to the 
public health itself (Scott et a1 2002, Zafarullah 
and Siddique 2001). Sadly to say, studies of 
public health laws enforcement and its capacity 
among public health inspectors are relatively few 
in existence (Transparency International 2000, 
Zafarullah and Siddique 2001). To meet the 
demand above, this study was carried out in the 
state of Selangor. 
* * Head of Department, Community Health 
Department, University Kebangsaan 
Malaysia 
I Lecturer, Community Health Department, 
University Kebangsaan hlalaysia 
Important and crucial public health laws in this 
state are pertaining to food hygiene and 
sanitation control, tobacco control and infectious 
diseases control. This is because cases of food 
poisoning in this state still occurs sporadically, 
while food and water borne diseases have never 
actually died down (Selangor Health Report 
2001). In 2001, from 4634 food samples taken, 
chemical violation was found to be the highest 
due to addictives usage. While for physical food 
violation, the highest cause was from foreign 
bodies pollution and violation in food labelling. 
Chemical violation with the beta agonist drug in 
pigs were also noted to be high (14.9% of 
samples taken). In 2001, 57.3% of confiscated 
food samples that were found not to abide with 
the Food Act 1983 was brought to court and 
67.2% (52 out of 83 cases) were prosecuted. 
Tobacco control regulations comes under the 
Food Act 1993 and was fully enforced in 1994. 
The purpose of this programme is to reduce the 
prevalence of smokers to less than 10% in the 
year 2010 (as health impacts related to tobacco 
inhalation and consumption are tremendous); 
deter and discourage teenagers from taking up 
smoking; to encourage smokers to quit smoking; 
reduce and halt the risk of tobacco smoke to the 
public or inhalation at work place and lastly to 
cultivate new agricultural alternative in replace 
of tobacco (Ministry of Health 1999, Nabilla Al- 
Sadat and Zarihah Zain 2002). Smoking at 
prohibited places such as schools, hospitals, 
shopping complexes will be fined and the total 
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compound issued in the year 1999 was 12,858. 
Lopes and Fonseca (2002) gave the example of 
how public health laws enforcement's 
negligence, which resulted in a rise of 
communicable diseases including dengue fever. 
Brian (1999), Crabtree et al. (2001) and 
American Public Health Association (2001) 
agreed that in an attempt to reduce the burden of 
mosquitoe population, capacity of enforcement 
should be stepped up. Another example of public 
health laws enforcement can be seen in a more 
stringent form in cases of respiratory tuberculosis 
epidemic seen in Wales England in 1997-1998 
(Annas 1993). Through their Public Health Act 
1984, air borne and infectious tuberculosis was 
examined mandatory and treated. Lack of health 
enforcement saw the surge in incidence and 
multidrug resistant strain of tuberculosis in New 
York (Frieden et a1 1993 &1995) and globally 
(Oscherwitz et al 1997, Schluger 2002). The 
district health departments and the local health 
councils, mainly provide the public health 
services and .facilities in this country. The public 
health laws pertinent in the district health 
departments which falls under the Ministry of 
Health, are the Food Act 1983 and Tobacco 
Control Regulations 1993, Destruction Of 
Disease Bearing Insects Act 1975 and the 
Prevention and Control of Communicable 
Diseases Act 1988. Meanwhile the local health 
councils, which are under the jurisdiction of the 
Housing and Local Government, are the Local 
Heath Act 1976 although they are empowered to 
utilize the health laws used by the Ministry of 
Health. Factors felt contributing to the capacity 
of public health inspectors enforcement are their 
working place and the unit they're in; post in 
employment; motivation; support from superior 
officers; acceptance of awards; 
acknowledgement given while in services; length 
of being in service; length working in a unit; 
knowledge in the Dangerous Diseases Bearing 
Insects Act 1975; income; exposure to bribery; 
frequency of bribery offered on the field; the 
adequacy in numbers of staffs and the sufficiency 
of enforcement equipments. 
OBJECTIVE AND HYPOTESIS 
To measure and compare the enforcement 
capacity of public health inspectors in the district 
health departments and local health councils 
throughout the state of Selangor. The working 
hypotheses are there will be a relationship 
between enforcement capacity and working 
place. Public health inspectors that have been in 
service longer, that have worked longer in their 
respective units, that work in the Food Control 
Unit, have higher (formal) income, have been 
awarded 'Anugerah Khidmat Cemerlang', have 
received acknowledgement while in services, 
have better superior support, are better 
motivated, have adequate numbers of staffs and 
sufficient equipment preparation and have better 
knowledge have higher enforcement capacity. 
While health inspectors that are more exposed to 
bribery and are offered bribery while on the field 
have lower enforcement capacity. 
MATERIALS AND METHOD 
A cross sectional study was initiated from July 
till August 2003 using a self-administered 
questionnaire and universal sampling. With the 
power of 80% and a significance level of 0.05, a 
total of 286 public health inspectors are included 
in the sampling frame. Exclusion criteria's are 
inspectors that have not been in service for the 
past 6 months (just started working or they are on 
leave). Inclusion criteria are inspectors that are 
required to do enforcement activity either 
individually or during activities together as a unit 
or with other units. The districts involved are 
Sabak Bernam, Kuala Selangor, Hulu Selangor, 
Klang, Gombak, Hulu Langat, Sepang, Kuala 
Langat and Petaling. There are 11 Districts 
Health Departments and 8 Local Health 
Councils, which participated. Public health laws 
used are pertaining to health laws used by both 
district and local health departments in this state. 
Estimation of sample size was calculated using 
difference in proportions between 2 group 
comparisons, using the formula by Dawson- 
Saunders and Trapp (1994). Thus sample needed 
is 88 individuals for each group and total of 176 
health inspectors was required. 
DATA COLLECTION 
The self-administered questionnaires for each 
individuals are pertaining to the socio- 
demographic background of the respondent, the 
enforcement capacity for the past 6 months and 
factors thought to influence enforcement ability 
(intrinsic, extrinsic and environmental 
influencing factors). Questionnaires are sealed in 
an individually stamped and addressed to the 
researcher, thus it can be mailed straight without 
having to go through their superior. Content 
validation of the questionnaire was done with 
inputs from 2 exeperienced, senior public health 
inspectors in the field of public health laws 
enforcement. Alpha Cronbach's reliability 
analysis for the overall questionnaire was 0.7608. 
Enforcement indicators used are to reflect the 
enforcement capacities. These are the number of 
compounds issued; number of unsanitary 
premises closure including food premises (with 
Medical Officer of Health) or closure of premises 
that contain breeding sites (for mosquitoes); 
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number of food sampling taken; number of food 
items confiscated; number of registered cases in 
court and number of cases won in court. A 
scoring system was used in evaluating the 
enforcement indicators given in the 
questionnaire. The scores given will depend on 
the difficulty of the enforcement activity itself 
and a cut off point was given to delineate 
between high and low enforcement capacity. The 
cut off point of 42 was reached after taking the 
official Ministry of Health enforcement 
indicators for the state of Selangor for one health 
inspector's enforcement capacity during 6 
months. Likert scale was used to score the factors 
thought to influence enforcement capacity. The 
factors are; the perception of superior support (1 0 
questions), motivation of staff (1 1 questions), 
knowledge (17 questions), the adequacy in 
numbers of staffs and the sufficiency of 
enforcement equipments (7 questions), exposure 
to bribery (10 questions) and frequency of 
bribery offered on the field (scale from 0 to 10). 
Bribery offer of 2 or more in a month is 
considered high category of bribe offer. 
Table 1: Alpha Cron~bach Reliability Analysis For Questionnaire 
Variables Capacity Alpha Cronbach 
High Reliability Analysis Low 
Superior support 10 - 39 40 - 50 0.7128 
Motivation 
Adequacy in staffs and 
enforcement equipments 
Knowledge 1 7 - 6 7  68 - 85 0.6044 
Exposure to bribery 10 - 3 9  40 - 50 0.7844 
DATA ANALYSIS respondents; length of service, length working in 
a unit and income (official and outside income) Data analysis was done using the SPSS 10.00. 
was not significantly different between the health Data presented descriptively and analytically inspectors from district health departments or the 
using t-test, Mann Whitney U Test, Chi Square local health councils (p>0.05). The min age for 
and multiple logistic regression. health inspectors from the district health 
RESULT 
A total of 99 respondents out of 145 district 
health departments' health inspectors and 100 
respondents out of 141 health inspectors, from 
the local health councils participated. This gave 
the response rate of 71.0% fiom the district 
health departments and 70.9% fiom the local 
health councils. This was due to difficulties 
retrieving the self-filled questionnaires fiom the 
respondents. Filling the questionnaire are also 
guided by one's own self of truthhlness and it 
may be difficult to give true input if respondent 
might query their superior's sense of 
suspiciousness on the subject. Mean values were 
added for missing values. To make sure that 
there was no significant difference between the 2 
groups of health inspectors that participated in 
this study, t-test analysis for normally distributed 
data and Mann-Whitney U Test done for non- 
parametric data. This revealed that among the 
departments are younger (34.7 * 9.3 years) while 
their counterparts fiom the local health councils 
are relatively older (38.7 * 7.6 years). T-test 
showed a significant difference at p<0.001 
among the age of health inspectors fiom the two 
different setting with health inspectors fiom the 
local health councils are relatively older. 
Qualitative variables such as post, race, 
acceptance of awards and acknowledgement 
given while in services were not associated with 
place of work. Factors of superior support, 
motivation, knowledge, adequacy in staffs and 
enforcement equipments was found to be better 
in health inspectors from the local health 
departments and it was statistically different with 
p<0.05. Their enforcement capacity was also 
higher but was not statistically significant from 
the health inspectors in the district health 
departments. Exposure to bribery and frequency 
of bribe offered were not statistically different 
between the 2 groups of health inspectors. 
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Table 2: Univariate Analysis For Differences Between The 2 Groups Of Health Inspectors 
Variables Mean level p value 
District Health Dept. Local Health Council 
Age (years) 34.7 % 9.3 38.7 5 7.6 0.001* 
Length of service (years) 10.2 % 9.1 12.2 * 7.7 0.087 
Length in unit (years) 5.48 5 6.18 5.69 % 5.07 0.71 1 
Income (RM) 1939.1% 640.2 2101.85 520.6 0.059 
Outside income 505.11% 720.03 4 1 1.92 % 245.49 0.224 
Total income (RM) 2030.4 5 754.7 2212.2 5 600.8 0.062 
Superior support 3 1.47 5 7.85 34.70 5 6.57 0.002* 
Motivation 37.10 i 6.08 38.88 k 5.99 0.037* 
Adequacy in staffs & 20.60 5 5.08 22.69 i 7.05 0.017* 
enforcement equipments 
Knowledge 62.00 5 7.20 64.60 5 6.98 0.010* 
Exposure to bribery 23.47 * 7.53 25.15 * 7.04 0.101 
Frequency of bribe offered 2.30 5 1.98 
on the field 
Enforcement capacity 94.69* 156.92 115.38k 184.59 0.125 
Only 91 health inspectors (45.7%) were to determine the association between 
in the high enforcement capacity category, that is enforcement capacity and factors influencing it 
enforcement scores of more than 42; while 108 (socio-demographic as well as intrinsic, extrinsic 
(54.3%) was in the low enforcement capacity and environmental influencing factors). 
category. Bivariate chi square analysis was done 
Table 3: Chi Square AnaIysis To Determine The Relationship Between Enforcement Capacity And 
Influencing Factors 
Variables Enforcement capacity (%) p value 
Low High 
Post of health inspectors Top level (U6, U7) 68.0 32.0 0.141 
U8 52.3 47.7 
Race Malays 54.4 45.6 0.997 
Chinese 53.6 46.4 
Others 54.5 45.5 
Age (years) <37 years 58.7 41.3 0.194 
237 years 49.5 50.5 
Units Food Control 21.7 78.3 -=0.0001* 
Sanitary & hygiene 47.4 52.6 
Others 
71.7 28.3 
Length of service (years) <9 years 60.8 39.2 0.059 
29  years 47.4 52.6 
Length in unit (years) <4 years 66.0 34.0 <0.0001* 
1 4  years 40.9 59.1 
Income (RM) <2000 55.8 44.2 0.63 1 
22000 52.3 47.7 
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Outside income (RM) No 56.4 43.6 0.249 
Total income (RM) 
Acceptance of awards 
Acknowledgement given 
while in services 
Superior support 
Motivation 
Adequacy in staffs and 
enforcement equipments 
Know ledge 
Exposure to bribery 
Bribe offered on the field 
Yes 
<2000 
22000 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Poor 
Good 
Poor 
Good 
Poor 
Good 
Poor 
Good 
Poor 
Good 
N 0 
Yes 47.0 53.0 
*Significant at p<0.05 
After controlling for confounding of public health enforcement capacity of health 
factors in multiple logistic regressions, 6 out of inspectors as shown in this table. 
17 factors became significant in the predictability 
Table 4: Logistic Regression 
B.  $ coefficient p value Odds Ratio 95.0% CI 
Factors Lower Upper 
1. Food Control Unit 3.068 <0.0001* 2 1.504 7.85 1 58.896 
2. Health inspectors U8 1.602 0.013* 4.963 1.397 17.630 
3. Length in unit 4 years and 1.699 <0.0001* 5.466 2.174 13.747 
above 
4. Acknowledgement given 1.037 0.023* 2.82 1 1.150 6.917 
while in service 
5. High exposure to bribery -3.797 O.Ol2* 0.022 0.00 1 0.428 
6. Being offered bribe 0.790 0.045* 2.204 1.018 4.772 
*Significant at pc0.05 
DISCUSSION different between the 2 groups of health 
Health enforcement's level on the whole for 
health inspectors is low (below the score of 42). 
Health inspectors from the local health councils 
are relatively older and more experienced from 
their counterparts from the district health 
departments and this was found to be significant 
statistically at p<0.00 1. 4 1.5% of respondents 
from the district health departments are below 30 
years old, while majority from the local health 
council, are between 35-45 years of age (46.0%). 
This was due to the fact that most of health 
inspectors from local health councils was 
previously employed by the Ministry of Health. 
Income is also higher among the health 
inspectors from the local health councils but it is 
not statistically significant. Other socio- 
demographic backgrounds are not significantly 
inspectors. Factors such as superior support, 
motivation, knowledge, adequacy in staffs and 
enforcement equipments was found to be better 
in health inspectors from the local health 
councils and it was statistically different with 
pC0.05. To see the reasons behind this, a brief 
background of the organizations is important. 
Local health council's fall under the jurisdiction 
of Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
while district health departments comes under 
the Ministry of Health. Power for health 
enforcement by health inspectors under the Local 
Government Act 1976 (Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government) are greater and widely more 
diverse than the power of health acts under the 
Ministry of Health. Health inspectors from local 
health councils more widely use the acts that 
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come under their jurisdiction, rather than acts 
from the Ministry of Health. They have better 
incentives and service for their staffs such as 
allocation of private health facilities, loan 
incentives for death or weddings, personal loans 
and remunerations. Decentralization of 
management also gives much authority to the 
health inspectors of local health councils. Even 
though it is still a top-down hierarchy of control, 
lateral spread of control is also evenly spread out 
(Transparency International Source Book 2000). 
Support in monetary sense, are easier to receive 
in the local health councils than district health 
departments. These give more motivation for 
their health inspectors and perceive better 
superior support from top-level health inspectors 
or the management. Revenues collected by local 
health council's inspectors are for the usage of 
the municipal itself, where else in the district 
health department's revenues are returned to the 
Ministry of Health itself. Local health councils 
are better off financially than district health 
departments as the background of the ministries 
involved differs. Their enforcement capacity was 
also higher but was not statistically different 
from the health inspectors in the district health 
departments. Exposure to bribery and frequency 
of bribe offered were not statistically different 
between the 2 groups of health inspectors. 
Generally, offer for bribery in the field is high 
i.e. twice in a month for all the health inspectors. 
The fact that it could be higher can't be denied. 
Food Control Unit is noted to have high 
enforcement capacity (adjusted odds ratio 22; CI 
95%: 7.85 1, 58.896). This is attributed to its long 
history since 1950's as an agent for food safety 
and hygiene control in the country (Ministry of 
Health 1999). This makes it a formidable force in 
health enforcement capacity both in the districts 
health departments and local health councils. 
However it is the unit most offered bribe 
(30.2%). The working target for food control 
units and tobacco control are also stringent and 
makes the health inspectors always on their toes 
and uphold the enforcement capacity of this unit. 
Unfortunately, that can't be said about the control 
of vector borne diseases in the state. The capacity 
of health enforcement of this unit is relatively 
low and does not correlate with the burden of 
vector borne diseases such as dengue in this 
state. The offer for bribe in this unit is 15.6%. 
Under capacity of this unit is very detrimental to 
the outcome of vector borne diseases (Brian 
1999), Crabtree et al. (2001), American Public 
Health Association 2001). There is also under 
capacity of the other units. Sanitary and hygiene 
unit under the local health council's jurisdiction 
also has a high capacity of enforcement. Offer 
for bribe is 9.5%. This is in relation of their work 
that handles the general neglect of cleanliness, 
sanitary of local parkshousing areas, toilets etc. 
Other units e.g. Communicable Diseases Control 
Unit are also facing under capacity of health 
enforcement. This is because the health 
departments generally do not compound or 
sanction anyone with communicable diseases. 
This differs fiom communicable disease control 
such as tuberculosis in New York 1998 (Frieden 
et al. 1993 & 1995) where incarceration and 
mandatory treatment was used. The under 
capacity in health enforcement can be caused by 
poor supervision by top management as in 
studies by Samart Powpaka (2002), Saleem 
Marsoof (2003) and James (2002). In this study, 
majority of respondents perceive superior 
support as poor and are in the low enforcement 
category (54.9%). However it was not found to 
be one of the influencing factors for enforcement 
capacity of health inspectors in this study. The 
perceived ideas to condone bribery reflect how 
someone are exposed and inclined to accept 
bribery on the field. Literatures have noted that 
bribery will reduce any type of enforcement and 
hampers any laws From being effective (James 
2002, Scott et a1 2002, Zafarullah and Siddique 
2001). This also applies to public health laws. A 
bribe will persuade authority to deter the 
enforcement action against wrongdoers and turn 
it towards their own incentive (James 2002, 
Jacobson and Wasserman 1999, Transparency 
International Source Book 2000). This study has 
found that low exposure to bribery (adjusted 
odds ratio 46; CI 95% : 2.336, 1000) will 
produce better enforcement capacity. An offer of 
bribe does not mean that they have accepted it. 
Laguerre (1994) found that if the culture of 
bribery is so rampant, another bribe just might be 
ignored and accepted as a norm and part of the 
'culture'. This offer of bribe occurs when the 
health inspectors are in the field doing their job 
of health laws enforcement activities. This is 
when the conflict of interest occurs and an offer 
might be suggested to the health inspectors. This 
study has found out that bribe offers occurs in 
high capacity health enforcement (adjusted odds 
ratio 3; CI 95% : 1.018, 4.772). I suggest two 
reasons for them. The offer of bribe occurs when 
an enforcement activity occurs. The more 
enforcement activity done, the frequency of bribe 
offer will increase. When an offer occurs, health 
inspectors will continue the initial enforcement 
actions and in fact become more determine to 
uphold the law. Another possibility is that when 
a bribe offer occurs, the offer might just be not 
lucrative enough for the officer to heed to the 
wrongdoer and will continue enforcement actions 
till a justifiable bribe offer come into hand 
(Laguerre 1994, Samart Powpaka 2002). It was 
found from bivariate and multiple logistic 
regressions, that length of working in a unit 
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determine the capacity of enforcement. The 
length of working 4 years and above in a 
particular unit makes the health inspector 
perform better, more in tune of the needs and 
responsibilities that is in need of them (Goulet 
and Frank 2002). Having worked for a shorter 
time does not make them more competent but in 
fact are less effective health enforcers. However, 
the factor of being in service longer than 9 years 
does not improve enforcement. Probably this is 
due to the fact after a longer period of time they 
will ultimately lose interest in their work and 
boredom sets in (Strait 1998, Transparency 
International Source Book 2000). As health 
inspectors, they also get posted in multiple 
different units that might not use much 
enforcement activities and becomes less 
productive. They might also get posted into more 
upper management position that does not see 
them running around doing ground enforcement 
work. Analysis found that working in the normal 
/lower post (U8 post) makes them better health 
enforcers (adjusted odds ratio 5; CI 95% :1.397, 
17.630). These health inspectors are also more 
junior and more motivated to perform health 
enforcement activities. Study by Keily and Peek, 
2002 found that younger police officers perform 
better enforcement capacity. Top management 
health inspectors (U6 and U7 post) are usually 
more as middle managers and generally 
supervise and handle the court cases due to their 
experience and greater responsibility. They 
generally does not do much enforcement activity 
in the field unless it is a group unit or with the 
Medical Officer of Health. The U8 health 
inspectors handle most of the local activity of 
health enforcement. That is why they have a 
higher capacity for enforcement than the U6 and 
U7 category. Enforcement capacity was not 
influenced by the health inspector's income. This 
is inconsistent with other studies that mentioned 
income is associated with the enforcement 
capacity (Bartosch and Pope 2002). The total 
incomes are actually combined outside income 
plus formal income. Formal income are also not 
influenced by the enforce,ment capacity of the 
health inspector, but income get higher according 
to seniority in service and post of the health 
inspectors. Outside income are actually incomes 
that are rather not declared by the health 
inspectors as it sometimes has legal implications. 
Thus any enforcement activity that the health 
inspectors do does not actually bring any income 
to them (unless taking monetary bribe). In a way, 
greater enforcement capacity does not bring any 
positive reward for them. However, this study 
found that acknowledgement given in service 
(adjusted odds ratio 3; CI 95% : 1.150, 6.917); 
either in the form of certificate or medal of 
excellence (due to good performance and high 
standard of duty) increases enforcement capacity 
of health inspectors. This is concurrent with 
other studies that found positive rewards would 
reinforce and further motivates workers to 
produce better performance (Maslach et al. 2001, 
Mills 2003). 
Factors that induce motivation can be 
divided into intrinsic factors and extrinsic factors 
(Li-Ping Tang dan Abdul Hamid Safwat Ibrahim 
1998). Examples of intrinsic factors are personal 
satisfaction of achievements or pleased with own 
working performance. External motivating 
factors are things such as monetary rewards or 
income. In enforcement of public health laws, 
external motivating factors such as formal 
income are somewhat static. This is in the sense, 
you won't get higher pay if you achieve a target 
of enforcement activity. Achievements that are 
not recognized by own working superiors (poor 
superior support); which majority of the 
respondents are in (54.9%), leads to poor staffs 
motivation in achieving enforcement targets. 
Knowledge in this questionnaire is quite 
restricted to knowledge pertaining to facts in the 
Destruction Of Disease-Bearing Insects Act 1975 
and its Amendment 2000. Both district and local 
health departments can use this act. However, it 
does not reflect the overall knowledge in public 
health laws enforcement, as it will be extensive 
and more diverse. The fact why knowledge of 
this act was asked is because of the burden of 
dengue as a vector borne disease in this country. 
The disease is so wide spread with high 
incidence that extensive knowledge of this act is 
important (Ministry of Health 1999). However 
majority of respondents (140 out of I99 
respondents or 70.4%) are in the low knowledge 
category and of poor enforcement capacity. 
CONCLUSION 
This study is aimed at defining the factors that 
play a role in determining enforcement capacity 
of public health enforcers. The overall 
enforcement capacity in this study, found to be 
low with high frequency of bribe on the field. 
Emphasis on ethics and morale of public health 
staffs; better supervision and transparency to 
deter bribery coupled with working rotation in 
the respective working units are steps that might 
ensure better enforcement capacity of staffs. A 
more practical and uniformity of public health 
laws might help enforcers better utilize the health 
laws in use. Lastly, further studies on public 
health laws enforcement and its capacity need to 
be further emphasized. 
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